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The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get
Taxes: Toward a Democratic
Theory of Tax Reform
by HARuop A. FREmBAN*
AND
TIMOTHY J. BALAND**
Introduction
If a case should ever arise, where an arbitrary and confiscatory
exaction is imposed bearing the guise of a progressive or any other
form of tax, it will be time enough to consider whether the judicial
power can afford a remedy by applying inherent and fundamental
principles for the protection of the individual. .. .I
That time has now come. The only constitutional provision au-
thorizing taxation is in Article I, section 8, which empowers Congress
to tax in order to pay debts and to provide for defense and the "general
welfare." One can view the defense and payment-of-debts provisions
as subordinate categories, merely instrumental to the achievement of
general welfare. Thus the authority to tax is premised on the notion
that the tax system will provide for the well-being of all the people.
As we shall demonstrate, the existing tax system actually serves
to undercut rather than maintain general welfare. Preference is given
to the "haves" over the "have-nots." Special interest groups have long
ruled the taxation roost. The system is in fact so regressive, both ab-
solutely and relatively, that it is constitutionally suspect, and not merely
"bad policy."
We do not attempt to fully argue the constitutional issues in this
commentary, which is primarily devoted to a demonstration of the sys-
tem's regressive quality. Rather, our intent is to note the issues that
arise out of the facts we present and outline a constitutional analysis
which it seems to us follows from those facts.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University School of Law
** Member, third year class, Cornell University School of Law
1. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109-10 (1900).
[681]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Several approaches suggest themselves. First, conventional pre-
sent-day tax wisdom stands on the shoulders of Knowlton v. Moore,2
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.3 and Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.4
These cases upheld progressive tax rates on the theory that since the
legislative choices involved were not irrational, the court should not in-
tervene. The door to intervention was not shut entirely nor perman-
ently, however, as the quote with which we started this article makes
clear. The key assumption in the cited cases was that progressive tax
rates would operate in a fair and rational fashion. But as we shall
demonstrate, the current tax system operates in anything but a rational
manner. That being the case, the old decisions are ripe for reexamina-
tion.
The rationality argument is buttressed by certain developments in
other areas of the law. A requirement of fairness has been found to
be implicit in the constitutional structure in a number of cases. Where
long-standing unfairness has produced inequity, the courts have found
that affirmative action programs are constitutionally required to right
the wrong.5 Moreover, the concept of due process has been expand-
ing--sufficiently so, we think, to threaten a tax structure which oper-
ates in violation of its own stated purpose.
Our position is also supported by an increasingly wide range of
cases which recognize the fundamental values of fairness and equality,
and which have read an equal protection component into the Fifth
Amendment. 7  The result in Bolling v. Sharpe,8 for example, stemmed
2. Id.
3. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
4. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
5. For example, affirmative action programs have been ordered or upheld in con-
nection with school integration and voters' rights cases. See, e.g., Swanm v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg B8d. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of
Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
6. In the area of criminal procedure, due process has required that effect be given
to Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as against the states. See, e.g., Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964): Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Procedural
due process cases in which the reach of the doctrine has recently expanded include Fu-
entes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
mem., 411 U.S. 981 (1974) [restricting the doctrine of Fuentes w'here a magistrate has
considered the ex parte petition].
7. E.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Cases suggesting that there is an
equal protection dimension to the Fifth Amendment include Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312 (1921), where Chief Justice Taft stated,. that the due process clause of the Fifth
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from the Court's proper sense that the federal government must prac-
tice the same fairness that the Constitution imposes on the states.
Moreover, there have been cases holding that it is proper to use taxa-
tion to ameliorate undesirable social conditions, as long as some fisc is
raised in the process."
The body of this paper, to which we now turn, demonstrates just
how inequitable, irrational and undemocratic our tax system is. The
conclusion presents constitutional and other arguments for the over-
haul of the system based on the facts set forth in the body of the ar-
ticle.
Wealth and Income Distribution
The Myth of Progressivity
America lives by a series of myths. One of the most pervasive
(and false) of these is that American taxation is "progressive," and
so causes the rich to pay more taxes that our wealth is redis-
tributed. The myth of progressivity-the notion that because of the
rate structure the rich are getting poorer while the poor are getting
richer-has long been vulnerable to attack, but nonetheless dies hard.
Thus the myth lingers-the special interest taxpayers have no incentive
to make the truth known, and ordinary taxpayers themselves do not
quite want to know the truth-the myth is more comfortable, and fac-
ing the truth that they have been cheated (or at least overcharged)
would be hard to bear.'0
Amendment "tends to secure equality of law in the sense that it makes a required mini-
mum of protection for everyone's right of life, liberty, and property, which the Congress
or the Legislature may not withhold." Id. at 331. See also Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), where Mr. Justice Stone stated that federal legislation
may be so discriminatory as to offend the Fifth Amendment, and Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), where the Court sustained a war measure directed against
persons of Japanese ancestry. The majority opinion clearly indicated that the Fifth
Amendment would normally bar discriminatory legislation, and Mr. Justice Murphy
rested his dissenting opinion on the ground that the racially discriminatory feature of
the law deprived "all those within its scope of the equal protection of the laws guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 235.
8. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (barring segregation in schools in the District of Colum-
bia).
9. E.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); Sonzinsky v. United
States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937). See also discussion and articles cited in connection with
this question in E. Gruswow., FEm.L TAx.TION 52-53 (1966).
10. The term "myth" has been used by several commentators. See J. RUSKAY,
HALFWAY To TAx REFORm 6-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as RusAY].
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Determining whether or not we have a "progressive" income tax
requires more than a mere examination of the statutory rates, which
nominally range from 14 percent on taxable income of $1000 to 70
percent on taxable income over $200,000. One must look beyond the
nominal rates to taxes actually paid.
First, rates under 20 percent bring in nearly 90 percent of the tax;
the so-called "progressive" rates account for but 10 to 12 percent of
income tax revenues.11
Second, individuals with incomes over $1 million pay an actual tax
rate of 24 to 26 percent; individuals with $20,000 incomes pay at a 23
percent rate- 2-- if that is progressivity, then the word has lost its mean-
ing.
Third, the working poor (families not on income support pro-
grams) pay over 50 percent of their incomes in taxes of all kinds. No
other group pays a percentage over 35 percent, except for a very few
peculiarly invested or very large wage earners.13
Fourth, in the quarter century since 1950, the effective tax rates
paid by high income groups have dropped significantly, while the rates
for low and middle income families have risen. In 1950, for example,
the middle 60 percent of American taxpayers bore 29.3 percent of the
federal tax burden, while the richest 20 percent bore 69.8 percent. By
1962, the middle group's share had risen to 37.3 percent, while the top
20 percent had its share reduced to 60.9 percent. During the same
period the lower 20 percent saw their share of the burden almost
double.14  Since 1962, things have not gotten any better. Thus, not
only is the middle income taxpayer's sense that his taxes are higher
than they ought to be proved true; these figures also establish that the
tax burden of the middle group has risen, not because the poor now
pay a smaller share of the federal tax burden, but because the rich are
paying proportionately less!' 5
11. All the pre-1964 progressive rates (rates above 20 percent) yielded less than
10 percent of total federal collections. Bailey, Basic Tax Reform, 54 A.B.AJ. 127
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Bailey].
12. Id.
13. Herriot and Miller, The Taxes We Pay: An Analysis of the Income Tax Bur-
den at Each Income Level, 8 CoNF. BD. REc. 40 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Herriot
and Miller].
14. Bateman, Taxes: Who Benefits and Who Pays, BusiNEss HORIZONS, Feb.,
1972, at 41, 62 [hereinafter cited as Bateman]; SURvEY oF CURRENT BusNms, April,
1958, at 17, and April, 1964, at 8.
15. Bateman, supra note 14, at 53. See also I. PEcmi A & B. OENEP, WHO BnAS
TH TAX BuRDEN? 10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PECHMAN & OENER], where the point
[Vol. 2
In summary, it should be observed that any tax is regressive which
charges every individual the same for a given service or in contribu-
tion to the general revenues regardless of rewards received from the
total system or his wealth created under it. Examples are social se-
curity, gasoline, energy, sales, real property, head, import and like
taxes. And even a tax (income or estate) of varied rates by wealth
categories becomes regressive if escape clauses allow wealth to plan it-
self out of the higher rates (effective rather than published rates being
the test).
Taxation and the Distribution of Wealth and Income
Perhaps the most invidious effect of the current state of affairs in
our tax law is its discriminatory impact upon and continuation of the
inequitable distribution of wealth, income, taxes and opportunity in this
country. Two key points need to be made: first, that the tax system
is the major determinant of the distribution of wealth and income, and
second, that the present tax structure in this country exerts almost no
positive effect on the redistribution of either. On these two points, the
experts are in accord.-' Indeed, one important study has concluded
that even under the most progressive set of assumptions, taxes as they
are now levied could reduce income inequality by less than 5 percent
in any taxable year; under a more factual and realistic set of assump-
tions, inequality is reduced by only 1/4 of 1 percent, which is to say
not at all.17
An equally important finding is that during the period between
1952 and 1967, the top 15 percent of the population in fact increased
its share of total income from 24 to 27 percent-a not insignificant im-
provement, which came at the expense of the other 85 percent of the
population. Furthermore, that the lower classes held their own as well
(as well!) as they did in large part was due to large increases in gov-
ernmental transfer (handout) payments. Even with these increased
government payments, the poor's income share suffered erosion,' 8
is emphatically made that while the total United States tax system is essentially propor-
tional (not progressive) for the vast majority of families, it is harshly regressive as it
applies to the poor.
16. See B. OKNrF, INCOME DisT=RIUTION AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 6 (1966);
PEcimAN & OKN-., supra note 15, at 10; Ackerman, Bimbaum, Wetzler & Zimbalist,
Income Distribution in the United States, 3 RAD. POL. ECON. Rnv. 21 (1971); cf. Herriot
and Miller, supra note 13, at 31.
17. PECHMAN & OKNER, supra note 15, at 64.
18. Pechman, The Rich, the Poor, and the Taxes They Pay, 17 TB Punuc INTm-
Esr 25 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Rich, Poor and Taxes].
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compounded by inflation, which was in part caused by the government
transfusion of funds. The following graph1 9 portrays existing maldistri-
butions starkly.
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As the graph shows, the top 10 percent receive 29 percent of all
income and hold 56 percent of all wealth, while the poorest 10 percent
receive but 1 percent of all income and owe more than they own. The
bottom half of all families receive less than a quarter of all income, and
hold a mere 3 percent of all wealth. Since the tax system as it stands
redistributes income hardly at all, and serves only to exacerbate the in-
19. FRIENDs COMM. ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION, TAXATION AND THE DISnBUTrnoN
OF WEALTH AND INCOME IN TuE U.S.A. 2 (Jan. 27, 1974) [hereinafter cited as FIENDS
CoMM.].
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credible wealth advantage already enjoyed by the well-to-do, one need
hardly look beyond these figures to discover a need for tax reform.
Of course, to advocate a more equitable distribution of income and
wealth via a truly redistributive tax system based on democratic princi-
ples means that one will be "taking' from the rich and "giving" to the
poor. Such redistribution is denounced by some as a deprivation of
liberty, in that property will be taken away by coercion. But the same
argument ought to be available to the poor now, for they are deprived
of their liberty under the existing tax laws. Apart from the fact that
the Supreme Court dealt this argument a heavy blow long ago,20 one
good conceptual answer to this (apparent) dilemma has recently been
offered by Kenneth Arrow. He takes an Einsteinian view of "free-
dom," regarding it as a constant in the universe. Thus, in Arrow's con-
cept, the unequal distribution of property and income amounts to an
inherently unequal distribution of freedom, and when we use the tax
law (as is here proposed) to redistribute wealth and income, the loss
of freedom by the rich is offset by the increase in freedom and control
over their own lives gained by the poor.2 The beauty of the trade-off
between wealth/income and freedom, to one who advocates redistribu-
tion of the former out of a commitment to democratic values, is that after
the redistribution has occurred, the rich still have more than ample
quantities of wealth, income and freedom to enjoy life as fully as any-
one could reasonably desire, while the poor, blessed for the first time
with something more than inadequate financial resources, will be able
to share in a meaningful way in the freedoms and opportunities which
the Constitution and our form of government were designed to insure.
To say all this in a slightly different fashion: the current distribu-
tion of wealth and income has no particular claim to priority or pro-
longation, and the current "special interests" system of taxation is not
owed till-death-do-us-part obeisance. Moreover, since unequal eco-
nomic power (that is, wealth and income) means unequal political
power, and since the Supreme Court has tried to equalize political
power by the reapportionment decisions,22 and since Watergate has
emphasized the disastrous consequences which may flow from the
exercise of unequal power, solid pragmatic and constitutional as well
20. Cf. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345 (1921).
21. Arrow, Taxation and Democratic Values, ThE NEw RPUmBLIC, Nov. 2, 1974,
at 23 [hereinafter cited as Arrow].
22. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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as equitable reasons would appear to be urging us in the directions we
propose. 23
The Causes of Inequity
To this point, we have argued that the current tax structure in the
United States is undemocratic and inequitable, and that a system based
on a democratic theory of taxation would redress the inequities and
help to solve some of our current economic problems as well. We now
want to zero in more closely on two or three of the most egregious
causes of the unfairness which we identified at the outset, and show
why change is needed and what shape it might take.
"Loopholes"-The Tax Expenditure Budget
Everyone knows that loopholes exist in the tax laws-provisions
which enable a taxpayer to avoid or reduce payment of taxes otherwise
due. Moreover, taxpayers naturally use such provisions, and they have
been told by the courts to do just this-to pay the smallest tax pos-
sible.24  Specific loopholes have long been identified and used-for
example, the homeowner's deduction of real estate taxes and mortgage
interest, or the use of the depletion allowance by extractive industries.
It was not until the late 1960's, however, that it occurred to anyone that
the multitudinous loopholes could be described generically.
Stanley Surrey, then an assistant secretary for tax policy in the
Treasury Department, coined the phrase "tax expenditures" as a gen-
eric label for all loopholes in 1967.11 Surrey pointed out that those
provisions of the federal income tax statutes containing special exemp-
tions, exclusions, deductions and other tax benefits were really methods
of providing governmental financial assistance. They were govern-
ment expenditures made through the tax system, and thus similar in
purpose to the direct expenditures in the federal budget.26 They were
tax "expenditures" because the provisions provided assistance via tax
reduction rather than by means of direct aid. In effect, Surrey argued,
there were two federal budgets-the normal one listing expenditures
23. The fact that more equal redistribution of income would lead to improved effi-
ciency in expenditures of federal revenues is but one such additional "pragmatic' reason;
increased spending by those no longer living in poverty, and thus an again-growing
economy, is another.
24. See Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
25. S. SuRREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX RFoRM 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SuRREY].
26. Id. at 6.
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for everything from paper clips to guided missiles and now totalling
over $300 billion, plus the tax expenditure budget2T--all those pro-
visions (now totalling some $91 billion)28 which permit the nonpay-
ment of taxes under certain circumstances.
Surrey, a reformer interested in restoring fairness to the federal
tax picture, observed that one major avenue to tax reform lay in the
elimination of tax expenditure provisions which enabled "many well-
to-do individuals and corporations" to escape the burdens of a system
which continued to place "an income tax on those still in the poverty
class."2 9  Most commentators agree with Surrey's judgment that the
loopholes constitute a primary source of unfairness in our tax system.30
We agree with that assessment and would take it one step fur-
ther. For under a democratic theory of taxation, poverty should be
overcome and goods, income, wealth and opportunity should be dis-
tributed without regard to race, ethnic group, social class, geographical
region, age, sex or any other irrelevant criterion."- But with a "special
interests" system of taxation, not even the much-heralded "war on
poverty" was able to make a dent in the inequality problem. 2
The tax expenditure provisions in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 cause the base to which federal income tax is applied to be nar-
rower than a comprehensive income tax base, including all income
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
29. SuTnnY, supra note 25, at 8.
30. See generally P. STERN, THE RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER (1974) [hereinafter cited
as STERN]; Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes' and Political Rhetoric, 71 MIcH. L. REv.
1099, 1128 (1973); Rich, Poor and Taxes, supra note 18; B. BLECHMAN, E. GAN micH,
and R. HARTMAN, SETTING NATIONAL PIoarrms: THE 1975 BUDGET 8 (1974) [herein-
after cited as SEGTTIN NATIONAL Ppiomrms].
31. This may sound utopian, but is it? A genuinely redistributive system of tax-
ation would (eventually) alter the figures shown on the graph in part II, section 2, so
that any given 10% of the population would receive approximately 10% of all income
and hold approximately 10% of all wealth. Discrimination means that some have what
others do not possess, and by definition a truly redistributive system of taxation would
go far toward eliminating that kind of inequality. Even if this system did not achieve
absolute parity among the classes, it is clear from the experience of the Scandinavian
countries that the tax system can be used to make everyone feel, with some justification,
that he or she is a roughly equal member of the society. And it is the sense of equality
or belonging which makes for the effective working together of ideologically disparate
groups in a society to get things done for the common good. See MmnISRy oF FINANcE
AND CUsTOMs, TAX IAW DEP'T, SuavnY OF THE NORWEGIAN TAX S STEm IN 1970; M.
NoRN, TAXATI N IN SWEDEN (1959).
32. In 1971, 25.6 million persons-12.5 percent of the American population-were
still officially "poor" (their incomes fell below the current, but outdated, "poverty in-
dex" developed by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare). Flnmns
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from whatever source derived, would be.33 Some of the more familiar
(and infamous) of these provisions are the special rate for capital
gains,34 tax-exempt interest on certain types of bonds,"- accelerated de-
preciation36 and the percentage depletion allowance for oil and other
extractive industries. 37 One measures the tax expenditure budget for
a given fiscal year by determining the amount of tax which would be
collected if these special provisions were not on the books. Recent
estimates place the total of such tax expenditures (or loopholes) at $91
billion in a single year.38 While the sheer amount of money which thus
escapes taxation is in itself shocking, what is even more troublesome
is the set of priorities which govern these tax expenditure outlays. A
year ago, when the tax expenditure budget was around $75 billion, the
Joint Economic Committee of the Congress estimated that over $60
billion of the total benefitted the 20 percent of the population with an-
nual incomes in excess of $15,000.39 That is to say, three quarters
of this extra governmental largesse goes into the pockets of that seg-
ment of the population least in need of such "assistance."40
Let us look at some of the figures involved a little more closely.
The capital gains rate differential saves the average millionaire
$641,000 per year in taxes; it saves those who make under $10,000
less than $8 per year.41 The percentage depletion allowance saved the
COMM., supra note 19, at 2. For a discussion of the obsolescence of the poverty index,
see Dodyk, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Poor, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 758, 787-89
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Dodyk].
33. Dodyk, supra note 32, at 759.
34. INT. Rnv. CODB OF 1954, § 1201 et seq.
35. Id. § 103 (a).
36. Id. § 57(a)(2), (3).
37. Id. §§ 57(a)(8), 611-13.
38. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1, quoting Chapter F of the official
1976 budget.
39. FRmNDs COMM., supra note 19, at 3.
40. Thus prompting Phillip Stem's description of the tax expenditure "budget" as
"Uncle Sam's Welfare Program-For the Rich" N.Y. Times, April 16, 1972, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 28. To be fair, it should be noted that one can subdivide the tax expenditure
budget into component parts which sound much less inequitable. For example, $20.7
billion of the tax expenditure total goes to the individual in his capacity as consumer;
$4 billion goes to the individual as recipient of governmental income maintenance trans-
fer payments, etc. SuRREY, supra note 25, at 61, 67. Nonetheless, the fact remains that
the tax expenditure budget is the primary source of unfairness, and what is more, these
provisions serve to reduce taxes by 50% for those earning $500,000 or more, by 43%
for those earning between $100,000 and $500,000, but reduce taxes for those in the low-
est three brackets by a mere 14%, if and as such individuals can take advantage of the
loopholes. SuRREY, supra note 25, at 69.
41. Who Pays Taxes?, Peace and Freedom, Feb., 1974, at 8 [hereinafter cited as
[Vol. 2
oil industry $1.3 billion in taxes in 1971 (the figure is up to $3 billion
today),42 yet barely 10 percent of the savings were invested in new
oil exploration, which is the supposed justification for the depletion al-
lowance in the first place.4" On top of that, in 1971 all oil and gas
companies paid taxes at an effective rate of but 15 percent (the statu-
tory rate is 48 percent) and the behemoths of the industry44 managed
to pay even lower effective rates, down to a mere 1.6 percent in one
instance.
45
These 1971 figures are by no means atypical; indeed, the figures
tend to stay about the same, year in and year out; only the companies
reporting the figures vary. One year Mobil pays the lowest rate; an-
other year it is Exxon which is able to combine percentage depletion,
accelerated write-offs and foreign "tax" credits (another name for
royalties, with vastly different United States tax consequences) in order
to achieve the lowest effective rate. And in the winter of 1973-74 we
suffered through a (manufactured?) period of "shortages" in petro-
leum products, the main result of which was vastly increased, non-taxed
profits for oil companies.46
We could, of course, extend this catalog indefinitely. With the
tax expenditure budget so alive and well,4 7 one could scarcely be ac-
Who Pays Taxes?], citing J. P cHm rN & B. ONR, INDIvMuAL INCOME TAX EROSION
(Brookings Inst. 1972).
42. N.Y. Times, March 2, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 3.
43. Who Pays Taxes?, supra note 41, at 9. This depletion "gift" has applied to
foreign oil as well as domestic oil, thus encouraging the importation of "cheaper" foreign
oil. The current energy crisis is one result of this aspect of the depletion allowance,
and it goes without saying that resurrection of the allowance with respect to foreign oil
would be in direct opposition to our stated policy of achieving energy self-sufficiency.
44. Gulf, Texaco, Exxon, Standard of California and Mobil are the largest. Id.
45. Standard of California was the company which paid out 1.6 percent in 1971.
Id.
46. 1974 oil company first-quarter profits were "incredible" according to The Pro-
gressive. The statistics were as follows:
Company 1st quarter profits % increase over 1973
Exxon $705 million 39%
Texaco $589 million 123%
Standard of California $293 million 92%
Gulf $290 million 76%
Mobil $259 million 66%
Standard of Indiana $219 million 81%
Shell $122 million 69%
Occidental $ 68 million 718%
THE PRor.RssrvE, June, 1974, at 11.
47. The following chart shows the growth in the tax expenditure budget over the
past decade:
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cused of flailing a dead horse if the list were extended. One could
cite, for example, the Internal Revenue Code's "housing program," the
provisions in the code which allow homeowners to deduct interest pay-
ments and taxes, and in some instances depreciation. This inures al-
most entirely to the benefit of wealthier taxpayers. The truly poor are
for all practical purposes excluded from participation, since those with
incomes in the $1000 to $2000 range derive but 88 of benefit per
tax return from the homeowner's interest and other deductions, while
those in the $4000 to $5000 range do only marginally better-$19.18
per return. Over 75 percent of the $7 billion in tax revenue lost
through the homeowner's deduction goes to benefit taxpayers with
$10,000 or more adjusted gross income.48  This is not to say that it
is wrong to encourage home ownership; but it is to say that it is un-
democratic and discriminatory to do so in such a fashion as to exclude
from assistance those who need help most. When large segments of
our population "lack the wherewithal to provide themselves the essen-
tials of a decent and healthful existence . . ."4 it is simply uncon-
scionable to spend $80 or $90 billion (or even $8 or $9 billion) in
a way which precludes participation or benefit by the poorest 10 per-
cent of the population. The net effect of the system is to provide a
"grant" of $1.00 to individuals with $3,000 incomes, while the million-
aire receives $725,865.0 Some of the major loopholes, and the
amount of revenue lost to the national treasury through them, appear
in the following table. 5'
Loophole Revenue Lost
Percentage depletion (oil & gas) $ 2.9 billion
Percentage depletion (other industries) 350 million
Capital Gains -investment income 14.7 billion
Capital Gains - agriculture 1.1 billion
1967 $36.6 billion
1968 44.1
1969 46.6
1970 43.91971 51.7
1972 59.81973 N.A.
1974 74.8
1975 81.0
1976 91.0
N.Y. Times, March 2, 1975, § 3, at 7, col. 1.
48. Dodyk, supra note 32, at 782-83.
49. Id. at 758.
50. SuRREY, supra note 25, at 70.
51. Fiscal 1975 T t Expendituro Budget, Z T x NqrrA 4, 10-17 (January 21,
1974),
[Vol. 2
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Depreciation & Property tax deductions-
homeowners 13.2 billion
Investment Credits & Depreciation-
manufacturing & service industries 9.7 billion
Tax credits, income exemptions-
multinational corporations 945 million
Charitable deductions 3.7 billion
Tax free interest on municipal bonds 3.7 billion
Deductible state & local non-property taxes 6.7 billion
The enormity of the figures, both in terms of the sheer dollar amount
involved, and in terms of the unfairness which the loopholes cause,
prompts our call for a major overhaul of the tax expenditure method
of conferring governmental benefits. The nature of the changes that
would take place in a tax system based on a democratic theory will be
outlined further in the third part of this article.
Social Security Taxes
Today the largest and most oppressive tax many Americans pay
is the social security tax. Since 1944, the percentage of total federal
revenue derived from payroll taxes for social security and unemploy-
ment insurance systems has grown phenomenally. In 1944, social se-
curity taxes provided 3.9 percent of all federal revenue; today nearly
30 percent of all federal tax receipts come from payroll taxes. During
the same period, income taxes paid by corporations have declined dras-
tically. In 1944, corporate income taxes accounted for 33.6 percent
of federal revenues; today, corporate income tax receipts account for
but 14.6 percent of the total federal tax burden. The following table
provides the comparative figures: 52
Individual and Corporate Taxes
Fiscal Individual Corp. Social
Year Total % Income Income Security Excise Other
1944 100 44.6 33.6 3.9 9.7 8.2
1949 100 43.8 27.0 5.8 17.7 5.7
1954 100 42.4 30.3 10.3 14.3 2.7
1959 100 46.4 21.8 14.8 13.3 3.7
1964 100 43.2 20.9 19.5 12.2 4.2
1969 100 46.5 19.5 21.3 8.1 4.6
1974 100 44.8 14.6 29.1 .6.3 5.2
If one adds the individual income taxes and the social security taxes
52. Nader, Corporate Taxes One-Third of Legal Rate, PEOPLE AND TAxEq, Oct.
1974, at 4.
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(which are paid only by individuals-the employers' percentage, it is
generally agreed, is actually and ultimately borne by the employee),
then the figures, taken together, are even more ominous. That is to
say, individuals now bear almost 3/4 of the federal tax burden while
corporations bear a meager 1/7 of the burden: 53
Individual and Corporate Taxes
Fiscal Year Total Individual Corp. All Other
1944 100 48.5 33.6 17.9
1949 100 49.6 27.0 23.4
1954 100 52.7 30.3 17.0
1959 100 61.2 21.8 17.0
1964 100 62.7 20.9 16.4
1969 100 67.8 19.5 12.7
1974 100 73.9 14.6 11.5
But the above figures do not tell even half of the truth about pay-
roll taxes. For not only are individuals discriminated against, vis-a-vis
corporations, but among these individuals, it is the poor and the near-
poor who are taxed most severely. As Fred Bateman has stated:
[Tihe major thrust of public policies since the New Deal. . . has
been to enlarge the ranks of the middle-income classes, not to give
the poor a share of the national product more nearly commensurate
with their share of the population.54
Nowhere is this more true than in the area of social security taxes.
Two main points need to be made. First, social security taxes
are not buying insurance. There is really no fund building up in the
treasury in which the tax-paying wage earner owns a share. While to-
day's pensioner may be getting back much more than he paid in, the
favorable pay-off ratio is declining and it is estimated that the system
will begin running deficits within one or two years.5  One's ability to
collect social security when he retires, and the amount he will receive,
depends on appropriations by Congress at that time. We are, in short,
mortgaging our sons and daughters to pay for our retirement, and with
53. Id.
54. Bateman, supra note 14, at 61.
55. Indeed, on January 24, 1975, the Advisory Council to the Social Security Ad-
ministration stated that benefits would begin to exceed receipts in 1976. No immediate
threat to current payment schedules would be posed, because there is a "cushion" of $50
billion in the so-called Social Security Trust Fund. Unless the method of raising social
security revenues is changed, however, we will be faced with either (a) rapid diminu-
tion of the trust fund, or (b) increases in the already high rates of the payroll tax. See
N.Y. Times, January 25, 1975, at 1, col. 8. The council has recommended that the in-
creasingly expensive retirement benefits be paid for through a "substantial infusion" of
general government revenues, rather than another increase in social security payroll
taxes.
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declining birth rates and increased life expectancies, we are painting
ourselves into a corner where either we will receive less than our
grandparents from the system, or our children will pay astronomically
greater amounts in social security tax in order to provide for us. Either
way, the current 15 percent-plus levy is a tax, not an insurance
premium.
Second, this tax is assessed on every nickel of wage income up
to the current cutoff point of $14,100,"6 whether earned at $1.60 an
hour or $160.00 an hour, and not at all above it. Because of the cutoff
point, which in prior years was even lower ($6,600 in 1965; $7,800
after that until 1969),17 social security taxes have had a negative im-
pact on the redistribution of income in this country.58 During the years
between 1962 and 1968, for example, social security taxes rose 22 per-
cent for middle-income groups, but rose over 60 percent for those earn-
ing $2000 to $4000 per year." "The promotion of income inequality
by the payroll tax is most strikingly evident when it is compared with
the effects of the individual income tax . . . ."0 While low income
earners are protected from federal income tax liability by various ex-
emptions and deductions, the social security tax continues to apply to
and tax low incomes without exemption "and at the highest effective
(average) rates of all taxes."'" Moreover, while under the income
tax those with the highest incomes pay (at least nominally) the highest
rates, the opposite is true for social security. Once wages go past the
cutoff, the effective rate decreases for each extra dollar one earns.
Finally, the payroll tax applies only to wages, salaries and self-em-
ployed income. Property income is exempt, again to the advantage of
the wealthy.6 2
Some figures might help sharpen this analysis. A person who
earns $3,400 per year currently pays a social security tax of over $415,
for which he or she will receive about $1,200 a year in benefits at age
65. A person who earns ten times as much-$34,000 per year-will
pay about three times as much tax and receive benefits of $3,200
56. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 3121(a)(1).
57. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 320, 79 Stat. 393, amending INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3121(a)(1); Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, §
108(b) (2), 81 Stat. 835, amending ITNT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3121(a)(1).
58. See SE-ING NATIONAL PRiogrIs, supra note 30, at 7.
59. Bateman, supra note 14, at 52.
60. J. BrrAIN, THE PAYROLL TAX FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 88 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as BRrITAiN].
61. Id.
62. Id. at 89.
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(nearly triple those of the low income earner). 3  The below-poverty
level taxpayer has his already inadequate income forcibly reduced by
one sixth; the affluent taxpayer has his income reduced but one thir-
tieth and is left with an income (pre-retirement) some eight times the
poverty level. 'In addition, he can look forward to more social security
retirement benefits than the low-income wage earner, though as com-
pared with the low-income earner he will almost surely need those
benefits less. Whatever else may be in doubt about our tax laws, the
regressivity of social security taxes as they apply to the poor is not.64
A final illustration of this unfairness is perhaps in order. If we
add the payroll tax and the income tax, the total federal tax structure
is regressive until one reaches a fairly high income level. As an ex-
ample, the effective tax rate for a family of two earning $10,800 a year
in 1973 was, because of social security taxes, actually higher than the
tax rate for a couple earning $15,600 that same year. In fact, the rate
on income of $10,800 was not exceeded until the couple earned nearly
$23,000 per year!6 5 As John Brittain has put it with marvelous under-
statement, "a situation in which a family at the $10,800 level will pay
at a higher rate than one near $23,000 calls for adjustment."""
Adjustment is of course much too mild a term. The point, none-
theless, is clear. If a person is "officially" living in poverty and ex-
cused from or otherwise unable to pay income taxes, then he should
not have to pay payroll taxes either. "If equity requires his exemption
from one tax, logic requires his exemption from the other.' ' "'
Death Taxes
The notion that the rich should pay some kind of tax on accumu-
lated wealth at the time of death has long been a strong tenet of Ameri-
can populist (and popular) thought. As far back as 1907, for ex-
ample, Theodore Roosevelt urged passage of a death tax as a means
of preserving a "measurable equality of opportunity for [future]
generations."66 A generation later, Franklin Roosevelt declared that
63. See BRrlTAIN, supra note 60, at 151-83, for a discussion of the effect of the
current social security tax on lifetime income inequality.
64. Id.; C. WALKER & H. Rluss, MAroa TAx REFoRm: URGENT NEcassrry OR
NOT? 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WAL ER & REuSS]; S InNG NAnONAL PRiorITIES,
supra note 30, at 12, 256; PECHMAN & OKNER, supra note 15, at 58.
65. BRIrAIN, supra note 60, at 92.
66. Id. at 94.
67. Id. at 254.
68. STERN, supra note 30, at 326.
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inherited economic power was inconsistent with the ideals of American
government;6 9 when the present estate tax law was passed in 1941 (it
has remained virtually unchanged since), he thought that it would ef-
fectuate the redistribution of wealth in this country.7°
But nothing so dramatic as a more equalized distribution of wealth
has come about in the intervening years. Indeed, if anything, the
situation has gotten worse since the end of World War ]I. 71 Further-
more, there has never been any real consensus as to the goals of death
taxes, beyond the obvious objective of raising revenue. Thus, though
the aim of reducing concentrations of wealth has long been part of the
folklore of death taxes, it has never really taken hold as a strong moti-
vating force behind the actual estate (and gift) tax provisions. Indeed,
even the revenue produced by death taxes has been declining.72
From the standpoint of a democratic theory of taxation, problems
raised by current death tax provisions are both many and varied.
Among topics frequently debated, for example, are questions whether
large estates are needed for capital formation in a capital-hungry so-
ciety, whether an estate or any other property should be taxed for any
purpose other than the production of revenue and whether large estates
should be broken up. Some of our outstanding tax theorists have
written on these topics, 7 3 and hearings on the question have beer held
in Congress. 4 There seems to be general agreement, both among the
commentators and within the Treasury Department, on the need for
reform of estate and gift taxation. There is even a fair degree of
unanimity on the kind of changes reform should bring about. What
has been written will not be repeated here, except in outline form, suf-
ficient for us to complete our picture of the need for across-the-board
progressivity in the tax system.
Some of the more widely recognized death tax loopholes include:
69. Id. at 306.
70. H.R. No. 1681, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, 643 (1935).
71. See C. WILCOx, TowARD SocAL WELFARE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMS & PRO-
POSALS ATTACKING POVERTY, INSECURrIY, & INEQuALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 14-16 (1969).
72. Before World War II, 7% of federal revenues came from estate and gift taxes;
today the same source provides but 2% of the revenues. CoMMISsIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENuE, ANNUAL REPORT 1973 V.; Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes:
The 1969 Treasury Proposals, The Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 CoLum. L. REV. 1365,
1366 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Kurtz & Surrey].
73. See generally READINGS IN DEATH AND GIWr TAX REFOR (G. Goldstein ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein].
74. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX RE-
FoRM STvums AND PROPOSALS, 1-IV (1969) [hereinafter cited as TAX REFORM STUDmS
AND PRoPosALs].
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(a) -the capital gains pass-through (without tax) at death;
(b) grandfather or generation-skipping trusts;
(c) -the gift tax: noncorrelated and noncumulating;
(d) the use of living and charitable trusts;
(e) the marital deduction and split estates.
Estate tax rates are also a problem. Although nominally progres-
sive-the statutory estate tax rates range from 3 percent on taxable es-
tates of $500 to 69 percent-plus on estates of $20 million and over-
percentages hardly tell the whole story. As the following chart" indi-
cates, the actual tax or effective rate paid falls far short of the rate
nominally imposed; to the extent that the two rates diverge, progres-
sivity and fairness are undercut.
Tax per
Gross Estate Size Rate Schedule Actual Tax
$500,000-$1,000,000 29%-33% 17.3%$1-$2,000,000 33%-38% 21.0%$2-$3,000,000 38%-42% 23.5%$3-$5,000,000 42%-49% 25.6%$5-$10,000,000 49%-61% 25.7%$10-$20,000,000 61%-69%$20,000,000 and over 69%+ J 26.8%
Among other things, equity in taxation means that "similarly circum-
stanced" taxpayers will have very nearly identical tax burdens.70 A
look at the major death tax loopholes, to which we now turn, proves
that not even this minimal objective is really achieved, and shows how
they further distort the erstwhile fairness of the system.
(a) Capital Gains Pass-Through
The capital gains pass-through highlights the need to correlate es-
tate and income taxes. It allows the transfer of appreciated assets at
death without the payment of any capital gains tax. As long as the
decedent holds the appreciated property until his death, he pays no
capital gains tax on appreciation which occurred in his lifetime, and
since the heir takes as his basis the fair market value of the property
at the date of the decedent's death, the capital gains tax is forever for-
given.77 If the heir sells, he pays a tax only on the gain which occurs
during his holding, and if he passes it on at death unsold there is again
no income tax. The potential for income tax avoidance is obvious.7
75. STE N, supra note 30, at 323.
76. C. SHOUP, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 105 (1966).
77. INT. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 1014.
78. The Treasury Department has estimated that at least $15 billion a year of capi-
tal- gains fall outside the income tax system because of this death tax loophole, 3 TAX
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(b) Generation-Skipping Trusts
Another device frequently used to reduce estate taxes is the
generation-skipping trust. If a grandfather with an estate of $10 mil-
lion took advantage of no loopholes and left his estate to his two chil-
dren equally, his estate tax would be about $6 million and each child
would receive $2 million. If each child lived on the income from that
$2 million, then each estate would pay a tax of about $750,000 or $1.5
million total, meaning that of the grandfather's original $10 million,
$2.5 million would pass to the grandchildren. If, on the other hand,
the grandfather left his money in trust, the income could go to his chil-
dren, then to the grandchildren alive at his death, with the remainder
to the great-grandchildren. The only tax would be the original tax on
the grandfather's estate, thus carrying the estate through three genera-
tions on one minimal tax. If husband and wife joined and used gifts
as well as the grandfather trust device, the advantage would be multi-
plied.79  As David Westfall points out, generation-skipping trusts not
only mean lost federal tax revenue; there are "indirect social costs"
which are perhaps as large and at least as invidious as the dollar amount
of taxes thus avoided, one such special cost being the creation of irrevo-
cable trusts in which large amounts of money or other valuable re-
sources are indefinitely tied up.80 The public got some notion of the
amounts of money and degrees of power that can be involved, during
Nelson Rockefeller's vice-presidential confirmation hearings.8'
REFORm STUDIES A PROPOSALS, supra note 74, at 331. An additional $4.5 billion
passed via the section 1014 loophole from decedents for whom an estate tax was not
required. The revenue lost would total at least $7 billion, and probably closer to $10
billion. Id. at 334.
79. The example is drawn from Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 72, at 1369. Treasury
Department data reveals that the generation-skipping device is most useful to the very
wealthiest estates-those over $2 million. As a department publication put it, the "situ-
ation unfairly discriminates against those persons of relatively modest wealth ... as
well as against all persons regardless of wealth who for personal or family reasons do
not desire to make use of these generation-skipping arrangements. . . . It leads to all
individuals ... having to choose between personal and family considerations, on the
one hand, and tax savings on the other. A fair tax system would not demand this
choice." 3 TAx REronm STumms AND PROPOsALs, supra note 74, at 389.
80. Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARv. L. REv.
986, 1007-08 (1970).
81. J. Richardson Dilworth, financial advisor to Mr. Rockefeller, disclosed that the
vice-president and 83 other members of the Rockefeller family are worth more than $1
billion, and that figure excludes Mr. Rockefeller's personal real estate holdings and his
vast private art collection. According to the Senate testimony, John D. Rockefeller, Sr.,
made about $1 billion, gave half of that away, and passed $465 million on to John D.
Rockefeller, Jr. The second generation gave away another $500 million and passed $240
million on to Nelson and his four brothers. Mr. Dilworth's statement that the family
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Not only does the generation-skipping trust provide a means for
tax avoidance; it also has a "crippling effect" on the progressivity of
the estate tax structure. 2 Only large estates are able to make use of
the device-smaller ones need the principal during the intervening
generation. Thus we have a loophole for the wealthy which only the
most wealthy can employ-a case of double discrimination, as it were,
and one more instance of the tax system giving an advantage to those
who really need no further advantage. As one writer has objected,
"If a testator wants to skip generations that should be his business, but
there should not be a prize of tax savings associated with it."'8 3  As
things now stand in this country great wealth, and great power, pass
from one generation to another by means of inheritance among a rela-
tive handful of families. However beneficent the intentions (and even
the actions) of such individuals may be, their vast and continuing fa-
milial accumulations of wealth and power are inconsistent with the
normative ideal of equality for all upon which this country was estab-
lished. It may well be that doctrines such as "one-man-one-vote" and
"no discrimination before the law" will have to expand to reach not
only into the voting booth or the jail, but also the tax laws. Votes are
not equal when "fat cats" control presidential and other campaigns in-
cluding those of judges and prosecutors; the law encourages discrimina-
tion when tax statutes add to the privileges already enjoyed only by
the rich.
(c) The Gift Tax
All estate planning makes use of the fact that the gift tax and the
estate tax are not cumulative, that there are exemptions from the gift
tax as well as the estate tax, and that the rates for each begin quite low.8 4
For example, a wealthy family of five married brothers, each with five
children, each child having five children, can give away $5 million dol-
is "totally uninterested in controlling anything" was disputed by executives of Eastern
Airlines (of which Laurence Rockefeller is the largest shareholder) who asserted that
the Rockefellers were highly influential in determining company policy. The largest
family holdings today, held outright by family members or in trust, are in Exxon, IBM,
Standard of California, Chase Manhattan Bank, Mobil, Eastman Kodak, Texas Instru-
ments and General Electric. N.Y. Times, December 4, 1974, at 1, col. 1; at 29, col.
1.
82. Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 72, at 1370.
83. Brannon, Death Taxes in a Structure of Progressive Taxes, 26 NAT'L TAX I.
451, 467 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brannon].
84. For a discussion of the relation between estate and gift taxes, see C. LowNDEs,
R. Kiun & J. McCoRD, F-EDEP.AL EsTATE AND GIFT TAxEs § 24.4 (3d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as LoWNDEs, KA & McCoRD].
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lars per year within the family without paying any tax merely by using
the gift tax exemptions. That would be $100 million in twenty years.
The same family could go much further, at minimal tax cost, by
making added gifts at minimal gift tax rates, simultaneously lowering
the remaining estate into lower estate tax rates. The interlocking
operation of estate and gift taxes is shown in the following diagram:
77%
573/4%
3% 21/4%
Numerous relatively small gifts (as in our example) are taxed at the
lower end of the gift tax scale, 5 yet the same gifts, one by one, reduce
the size of the estate and thereby reduce the estate tax rate which will
eventually be applicable. On a $10 million estate, for example, to pick
up our earlier illustration, the normal estate tax would be about $6 mil-
lion. If the decedent disposed of his wealth during his lifetime, how-
ever, he would be able to give away (to the same heirs) some $6 mil-
lion, on which gift taxes would normally be about $3 million. The tax
saving (and revenue lost) is $3 million. The serious element of un-
fairness8" in all this is that smaller estates, not to mention those tax-
payers who pass on to their reward without leaving a taxable estate at
all, are unable to take advantage of this exclusive, rich-only loophole.
(d) Living and Charitable Trusts
A fourth set of estate tax provisions favorable to continued control
of wealth and power by the wealthy are those dealing with living (inter
85. The tax is 24% on amounts not over $5,000. INT. Ruv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2502(a).
86. Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 72, at 1373.
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vivos) and charitable trusts. 87  The variations here are infinite, but the
effect always the same. One may escape income tax by creating a ten
year "Clifford" trust,88 making the income taxable to another (the
beneficiary), but with the property reverting to the settlor at the end
of ten years. Or one may create a trust in which the grantor gives
up all rights except management and escape both income and estate
taxes.89  Additionally, one can, during his lifetime, create private or
public foundations, pay no estate tax, deduct the charitable gift from
yearly taxable income and thus save large income taxes, and yet con-
tinue to exert at least influence if not control over voting of stocks or
other assets.90 The same can be done by will with avoidance of estate
taxes only. Oftentimes it is not the dollar amount of wealth involved
that is important but the power that attaches thereto. And, though the
1972 Tax Reform Act imposes heavy restrictions on private founda-
tions, it does not completely destroy the basic wealth-control benefits. 91
The Marital Deduction
The marital deduction permits up to one half of an estate to be
transferred to the surviving spouse (if full control is given) without es-
tate or gift tax.92 This in effect permits every family to consist of two
estates, each one half as large as the family wealth and thus transfer-
able at lower estate tax rates. If one half of a decedent's estate goes
to the surviving spouse, the combined effect of these provisions is thus
to tax only half of it, and that at a much-reduced rate. In theory, of
course, the lost revenue is recouped when the surviving spouse dies,
but since the survivor may reduce the estate significantly by making
tax-free or low-tax gifts and since either spouse can make use of the
other loopholes discussed here, a large part of the revenue is lost
permanently to the federal government.
87. The Internal Revenue Code allows a deduction for transfers for public, chari-
table and religious uses. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2055. For a discussion of tax avoid-
ance by means of inter vivos transfers, see LOWNDES, KRAMER & McCoRD, supra note
84, at 902-31, 1000-21.
88. Ir. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 673; see discussion in Lowi DEs, KR sR & Mc-
CORD, supra note 84, at 1002.
89. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 675; LOwNDEs, KRA ER & McCoRn, supra note 84,
at 968-71, 1003-04.
90. See STAFF OF SENATE COMm. ON FINANCE, 89TH CONG., 1ST SEss., TREASURY
DEPARTmENr REPORT ON PRiVATE FouNDAnoNs 8-9, 37045 (1965).
91. See Johnson, The Privation Foundation is Alive and Moderately Well, 35
MONT. L. REv. 53 (1974).
92. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056.
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Over the years the marital deduction has come in for heavy criti-
cism on two main scores: one, the provisions are too complex; and two,
they are too harsh in the way they operate on widows in cases where
the relatively small estate proved inadequate to meet the family's needs
when the widow had responsibility for raising minor children. The
1969 Treasury Department proposals aimed at solving both problems
by means of an unlimited marital deduction.93  Such an unlimited de-
duction may be simpler but it only compounds the advantage of the
wealthy in the guise of response to the emotional appeal of less-
wealthy widows.94 We would not accept the Treasury proposal.
Income, wealth, opportunity and power are already unequally dis-
tributed in this country. That the state and gift tax laws do nothing
to redress that imbalance is sufficient criticism. 95 That they in fact al-
low, authorize and facilitate the perpetuation and increase of that in-
equality to the third and fourth generations is a potent argument for
overhaul of the total tax system and quick adoption of a democratic
theory of taxation.
Inflation
Strictly speaking, inflation cannot be described as a loophole, but
the topic deserves mention here because the effects of inflation bear
most heavily on the poor. 0 For the last two years the media have car-
ried almost daily accounts of increasing prices for food, gasoline, hous-
ing, etc. Yet a recent study by the Congressional Joint Economic
Committee shows that the biggest increases for consumers in 1974
were for income and social security taxes. The figures were as fol-
lows:9 7
93. See 3 TAX REFORM STrUmS AND PROPOSALS, supra note 74, at 358.
94. The amount of revenue lost was estimated at 13% of estate and gift tax reve-
nues for a ten year period; losses after that were estimated at 10% annually. TAx RE-
FORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra note 74, at 44.
95. President Truman summed things up this way in 1950: The estate and gift
tax law contains "excessive exemptions, unduly low effective rates. . . and. . . favors
large estates over smaller ones [putting] substantial amounts of wealth completely be-
yond the reach of the tax laws." H.R. Doc. No. 451, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1950).
96. "The percentage increases in tax associated with inflationary rises in income
will be greatest for taxpayers with very low tax liabilities .... " Murray, Income Tax
Progression and Inflation, 35 TAX. REv. 47, 48 (1974).
97. The figures are based on the effects of inflation on a family of four with in-
come of $14,446. See CONGRESSIONAL JOINT ECON. Comm. REPORT, STUDIES IN PRICE
STABILITr AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. No. 1: INFLATION N TIM CONSUMER IN 1974,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), as quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1975, at 14, col. 1.
The effect is undoubtedly worse on the genuinely poor,
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Item Percentage Increase
Food 11.9%
Housing 13.5%
Transportation 14.3%
Social Security Taxes 21.6%
Income Taxes 26.5%
As journalist Tom Wicker noted, the committee report is full of "other
evidences that under the American tax and economic system, the rich
generally get richer and the poor get poorer." '98 For example, families
earning more than $50,000 a year in 1973 could make as much as
12 percent ($6,000) more in 1974 without paying higher taxes, while
poorer families with a similar percentage increase would wind up in
a higher tax bracket. In the words of the committee, "inflation wor-
sens rather than improves the income redistribution function of the tax
system."90
Another reported example of how inflation perversely affects the
distribution of income is the fact that federal, state and local income
taxes for a family of four earning $9,320 rose by 31 percent in 1974,
yet income taxes for similar families earning $14,466 or $20,883 rose
only 26.5 percent. The report concludes that the "spiraling inflation
of the past three years has had an adverse impact on all consumers,
but the poor have clearly borne a greater burden."'10  Congress may
not be able (or willing) to do much that directly affects the price of
meat or bread, but Congress can directly affect the income and social
security taxes paid by low and moderate income wage earners. Infla-
98. N.Y. Times, February 11, 1975, at 39, col. 1.
99. N.Y. Times, February 10, 1975, at 14, col. 1. The report gives this example:
"An average four-person family with an income of $13,000 in 1973 took the standard
deduction and paid $1,391 in federal income taxes. Its disposable, after-tax income was
$11,609. Let us assume that this family's income rose 8 percent in 1974 to $14,040
(per capita personal income rose 8.3 percent from third quarter 1973 to third quarter
1974). This family would be liable for $1,609 in federal income taxes and its after-
tax income would be $12,431. This means that the family's after-tax income in dollar
terms has risen by 7 percent. The higher taxes that resulted from the diminished value
of the standard deduction and the exemption actually increased the tax burden on this
family from 10.7 percent of income to 11.5 percent.
"In real terms, of course, this family's real after-tax income has fallen as a result
of higher taxes and inflation. Measured in 1973 dollars, its 1974 disposable income of
$12,431 is actually worth only $10,939. Therefore, even though the family's income
rose by 8 percent during 1974, its purchasing power has dropped 6 percent.
"Even if this family's income had risen by the rate of inflation, 12 percent, its after-
tax purchasing power would have declined 3 percent from 1973 to 1974."
100. N.Y. Times, February 10, 1975, at 14, col. 1.
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tion adds to the inequity of the tax system; inflation is therefore one
more good reason for reform now.
A Democratic Theory of Taxation
Congressman Henry Reuss has urged tax reform to achieve four
fundamental purposes: (1) to raise additional revenue; (2) to achieve
full employment and prosperity; (3) to encourage economic efficiency;
and (4) to make the tax system more equitable." 1 All of these are
important and necessarily follow when tied together by a truly demo-
cratic theory of taxation. But it is the fourth of these goals which is
the key to democratic equality and which most concerns us here.
As Pechman and Okner have pointed out, given certain not im-
plausible assumptions (for instance, that corporate and property taxes
are shifted in whole, or at least in part, to consumers and renters), then
even those United States citizens who receive transfer payments (es-
sentially for income maintenance) from the United States government
wind up paying 21.5 percent of their "income" in taxes.102 Just as
great wealth and high income in this country are often based on "noth-
ing more than the 'talent' that certain people have for inheriting large
fortunes,"'' 0 so also is the predicament of the poor an accidental con-
dition. As things now stand, the tax system does too much to perpetu-
ate the former, and too little to alleviate the latter condition. What
we are proposing is a tax system which would truly function as some-
thing of an equalizer.
The chief characteristics of such a democratic theory of taxation
are: (a) it guarantees every family at least the minimum essentials
of life; 04 (b) it fulfills the basic political thesis of "one-man-one-
vote"0 5-- no one should have added political power on account of
wealth; (c) it imposes tax proportionately to the benefits and protections
received from the system; (d) it provides the revenue which would as-
sure education and health, job and earnings, small savings, a home and
a dignified old age; and (e) it redistributes wealth and power when
their distribution becomes inequitable and undemocratic.
Such a democratic theory would go far toward solving some of our
101. WALxER & REUSS, supra note 64, at 18-33.
102. PncKMAN & OxNER, supra note 15, at 65, 78.
103. Gurley, Federal Tax Policy, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 319, 326 (1967).
104. Cases like Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) and Randone v. Superior
Court, 5 Cal. 3d 356, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) have emphasized the es-
sential need to provide a minimally decent environment for human beings in their every-
day lives.
105. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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most pressing problems: poverty amid plenty, unemployment (and
particularly disproportionate unemployment), inflationary recession,
energy crisis, maldistribution of wealth and buying power, overexpan-
sion and ecological-natural resource plunder. The wide gap, in terms
of wealth, income and opportunity which exist between the "haves"
and the "have-nots" in this country would be narrowed. In terms of
the specific problems which have been discussed in this paper, the re-
distributive goal of a tax system based on a democratic theory would
be achieved by reforms such as those which follow (these are sugges-
tive, not exhaustive).
(1) Elimination of tax laws which give special privilege or bene-
fit to special interest groups and the rich. Capital gains, tax-exempt
interest, accelerated depreciation, percentage depletion, foreign and
realty tax shelters, investment and tax credits, etc.-all these would go
out the window.106 As Professor Surrey and others have suggested,
the tax expenditure budget (that is, the special interest system of taxa-
tion) should be replaced by direct programs of financial assistance
which are voted out of public revenues by elected officials after public
debate.11 7  Many of these tax expenditure items have not had the de-
sired incentive effects, 0 8 and switching to direct subsidies would per-
mit us to separate the wheat from the chaff. Even a modest reform
package on these loopholes would raise federal revenue by $16 bil-
lion -by 1978; a more thoroughgoing house-cleaning would raise $33
billion in new revenue.10 9 Reform in this one area alone would go
a long way toward eliminating the current budget deficit.
106. On March 29, 1975, President Ford signed into law a tax bill eliminating the
oil depletion allowance except for small producers. See note 135 infra. We do not
mean to suggest here that the presence of such loopholes in the Internal Revenue Code
makes the American tax system the most undemocratic in the world. In Brazil, for in-
stance, the goal of "expanding capitalism" leads to the use of the tax laws to create capi-
tal in the hands of the system's controllers at the expense of unskilled workers, 45 mil-
lion of whom are not yet covered by any program of social security. The difference
between the minimum federal wage in Brazil and the top executive salaries is a ratio
of 500 to 1; the minimum wage is $40 a month while top executives earn $300,000 per
annum from salaries alone. The ratio in this country is approximately 60 to 1. See
Koeppel, That 'Brazilian Miracle,' THE PRoonSsivW, Feb., 1975, at 43.
107. See SuMREy, supra note 25, at 175-208.
108. The oil depletion allowance, combined with provisions which permit oil com-
panies to exempt intangible drilling costs, has reduced effective tax rates for oil com-
panies and resulted in huge revenue losses to the treasury (over $3 billion in fiscal
1975), but did not result in the kind of exploration and drilling which these "loopholes"
were designed to foster and which might have averted or at least minimized the energy
crisis. See SErING NATONAL 1PAxoRrSO , supra note 30, at 161.
109. Id. at 258.
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(2) Social security taxes must be overhauled. These taxes now
provide twice as much revenue as is collected from corporate income
tax, and though the individual income tax rates on income go as high
as 70 percent, the bite of social security taxes for upper income indi-
viduals is miniscule. 110 Congressman James Burke has recently pro-
posed that the percentage rate drop from 5.85 percent to 3.9 percent
with the lower rate to be imposed on earnings up to $25,000.11 The
Advisory Council to the Social Security Administration has recently re-
ported that social security benefits will top receipts by 1976.112 The
council estimates that an additional $7 billion will be needed, and has
apparently rejected a proposal similar to Mr. Burke's as being "a move
beyond the philosophy" of the system.' 18 The only alternative meth-
ods of raising the needed $7 billion appear to be (a) increasing the per-
centage rate yet again-the council has considered rates as high as 9.75
percent on both employer and employee," 4 or (b) tapping general tax
revenues. The latter course was finally recommended to Congress by
the council, but what action will be taken remains to be seen.115
The same solution has also been strongly urged by John Brittain,
a commentator who would simply replace payroll taxes by the income
tax." O6 Even if nothing additional were done by way of income tax
reform, the poor and middle classes would be better off than they are
now, and if income tax reform were to accompany the switch from pay-
roll taxes to general revenues as the source for social security benefits,
the broadened tax base would mean that very little, if any, income tax
rate increase would be needed to provide sufficient social security
funds. Under one combined income tax-payroll tax proposal, .for ex-
ample, individuals with incomes under $7,000 would pay no federal
110. Individuals earning up to $14,000 a year pay 5.58% of their earnings in social
security taxes. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3101(a)(5) and (b)(4). Another 5.85%
is paid by the employer. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3111(a)(5) and (b)(3). Since
the latter 5.85% lessens what the employer would otherwise pay the employee in wages,
the entire tax comes out of the employee's pocket. A person earning $5,000, for ex-
ample, pays about $600 in social security taxes, yet with ordinary exemptions the same
individual would pay no income taxes. Persons earning $20,000 or $100,000 pay only
$825 in social security taxes, the same as the $14,000 wage earner. INT. Rev. CODE
OF 1954, § 3121(a)(1).
111. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1975, at 18, col. 3.
112. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 7.
113. Id. at 14, col. 4.
114. The Washington Post, Jan. 16, 1975, quoted in The Ithaca Journal, Jan. 18,
1975, at 1, col. 1-6.
115. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
116. BnrAiN, supra note 60, at ch. V.
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taxes whatsoever.117 Total taxes for the majority of taxpayers would
be reduced, the rate structure would be much more equitable, and the
rich would finally start paying their fair share.
(3) Death taxes would likewise really start to bite. Theoretic-
ally, a good case can be made for viewing the death tax as a delayed
income tax on decedent's income."" Increased estate taxes-which
can be justified as being more consistent with the goal of equal oppor-
tunity than increased income taxes would be, since the death tax re-
duces inherited wealth rather than earned wealth"l 9-would make it
possible to avoid exorbitant income tax rates at the higher levels while
at the same time going far to make the whole tax system more truly
democratic and progressive. Special changes would likely include (a)
the taxation of appreciated assets at death, perhaps in the form of an
accessions tax; 20 (b) imposition of taxes at least once each generation
on each transmission of wealth;' 1 (c) a ceiling on the amount of
wealth which can be transmitted upon death-a figure of three or four
times the income of the upper middle class ($75-100,000) comes to
mind:"'2 and (d) unification of death and gift taxes--one set of exemp-
tions, one set of rates, cumulative, and not based on who the recipient
is.123
(4) Finally, any truly democratic system of taxation would in-
clude some form of negative income tax or other allowance to assure
that even the least among us have a sufficient income to guarantee the
necessities of life. A figure in the $7,000 range is not unrealistic, for
the goal is to provide enough so that everyone can regard him or herself
and be regarded by others as a person of dignity.'2 4
117. Id. at 149.
118. See generally Brannon, supra note 83.
119. Id. at 452-53.
120. For discussion, see Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, in Goldstein, supra
note 73, at 190, reprinted from 22 TAX L. REv. 589 (1967); Jantscher, Death and Gift
Taxation in the United States After the Report of the Royal Commission, in id. at 235,
reprinted from 22 NAT. TAX J. 121 (1969).
121. See concerning this subject Westfall, Revitalizing The Federal Estate and Gift
Taxes, in Goldstein, supra note 73, at 146, reprinted from 83 HAnv. L. REV. 986, 1006-
13 (1970); Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 72, in id. at 154.
122. This may sound draconian, but when 1% of the population holds 56% of all
wealth, draconian measures are called for.
123. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX REFORM STUDIES & PROPOSALS, UNIFICATION OF ES-
TATE AND GIFT TAXEs, pt. 3, 351-57, 360-77, 381-87 (1969), in Goldstein, supra note
73, at 78; Kurtz & Surrey, supra note 72, at 1389-91.
124. The new tax bill, while not constituting a real income plan, at least helps to
establish the validity of cash payments to the poor as a viable means of redistributing
income. Redistribution of income is, of course, a democratic principle central to the
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Conclusion
It may be that we need to re-examine our concept of "uniformity"
as it was defined in Knowlton v. Moore,125 Flint26 and Brushaber,127
in light of the preceding materials.
The kind of challenge we have in mind may be sketched out
briefly. Article 1, sec. 8, and the Fifth Amendment, are our touch-
stones.
First, the need for a new constitutional analysis arises from the
fact that over the last twenty-five to thirty years the tax structure has
become increasingly regressive.12 8  Since World War II, the duty to
pay taxes has resulted in the increasingly inequitable invasion of small
earners' incomes. Over the entire history of federal taxation, of
course, the "intake" accomplished by use of the taxing power has been
increased by taxing excess profits, increasing tax rates and by greater
wealth inclusion-all without any serious constitutional challenge being
raised. 29 Because these changes were essentially democratic or "pro-
gressive" in character, no constitutional challenge was either necessary
or proper. But that historical lesson loses its validity as a guideline
for current thinking on the question of constitutional re-evaluation of
the tax system when the tax structure is so visibly regressive rather than
progressive.
Second, we believe that a taxpayer's suit, rather than an effort to
secure a new constitutional amendment such as the Sixteenth, would
be the best vehicle for raising the constitutional challenge, if Congress
does not act, for three reasons: 1) Speed. A suit can be put together
and brought to final determination more quickly than a proposal for
a constitutional amendment. 2) Logistics. Taxpayers' suits can be
initiated by a few people in many places, making for a great cumulative
effect, whereas to secure a constitutional amendment requires many
people in one place at first (Washington) and later many people in
many places (the various state capitals). 3) Case law. Scattered
through a wide range of Supreme Court decisions there is much help-
approach and content of this paper, and it may be that the 1975 tax bill will eventually
come to be seen as the first real step taken in this country toward the guaranteed in-
come we have proposed. See note 135 infra.
125. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
126. Flint v. Stone Trace Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
127. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
128. See text accompanying notes 10-16 supra.
129. 1 S. StmmY, P. McDAINmL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INcomE TAToN 15-17
(1972).
Summer 1975] TAX REFORM
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
ful language which suggests, if one only ferrets it out, that the Court
might well be favorably disposed to such a challenge. It is to that case
law we now briefly turn our attention.
Standing
The old posture of absolutely denying taxpayers standing to sue
(Massachusetts v. Mellon)13 0 is now dead. As the Court said in Flast
v. Cohen,'31
a taxpayer will have standing. . . to invoke federal judicial power
when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and
spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions
which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending
power.' 32
In sum, there is a growing tendency to recognize a taxpayer's standing
to challenge a tax because it is raised or expended for unconstitutional
purposes, or in unconstitutional ways.' 33
Present Exemptions from Taxation
The major present exemptions from federal taxation exist because
certain policy decision have been made, and not because the exemp-
tions are constitutionally compelled.' 34  Indeed, the anti-recession tax
bill passed by Congress and signed by President Ford on March 29,
1975, eliminated the oil depletion allowance for all but the smallest
producers; 3 5 and, there are cases suggesting that the emphasis on im-
munity from taxation for state and local government bonds should be
changed to a limitation upon the grant of tax immunity. 36  These
changes have come about precisely because the policy reasons for con-
130. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
131. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
132. Id. at 105-06.
133. See id. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1 (1962);
McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.
1971), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); Bob Jones University v. Con-
nally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971). Compare Pietsch v. President, 434 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1970) with Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601
(1968) and Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer's Suit
Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 364, 375 (1969). See also
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
134. For a discussion of the policy reasons behind tax exemption of interest earned
on state and municipal bonds, see Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Ap-
proaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures With Direct Governmental Assistance,
84 HARv. L. Rxv. 352, 371-80 (1970).
135. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, §§ 601-04 (Mar. 29, 1975).
136. E.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
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tinuing the exemptions no longer exist, and because we have become
increasingly aware of the unfairness which the exemptions create. The
point here is that a taxpayer's suit challenging the constitutionality of
existing exemptions does not involve asking the court to rewrite the
Constitution. Rather, such a suit would suggest that existing exemp-
tions fail the constitutional test for imposition of taxes: that they be
uniform and provide for the general welfare. Moreover, when the ex-
emptions exist because of policy reasons, the exemptions can be
changed or eliminated for policy reasons. Thus the taxpayer's suit
would attack the tax structure on two related but distinguishable
grounds: reasons of policy, and the Constitution.
The Concept of General Welfare
The original meaning of the term "general welfare" may have
been merely to signify something "beyond the power of the states,"
something which was in the "general interests of the union."'1 37 How-
ever, from the earliest time after adoption of the Constitution, the
Court's emphasis has been on federal powers as derived from all the peo-
ple and operating for the benefit of all the people.18 Generally the
Court has deferred to Congress when it comes to defining what the gen-
eral welfare consists of,' 39 and this deference has extended to congres-
sional tax enactments designed to regulate or even suppress certain con-
duct. 40 To the extent that the Court has defined the term, even its most
restrictive opinions' 4' have acknowledged the correctness of the Hamil-
tonian view that the general welfare clause embodies a separate and dis-
tinct power, one which goes beyond the other express bases upon which
the taxing power may be invoked. 14  When the cases upholding the con-
stitutionality of "progressive" taxation 43 are anchored in the assumption"
that constitutionality follows from the progressive operation of the grad-
137. 2 M. FautAND, TiE RECORDS OF THE FEDERALCONsrimONAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, 25-27 (1937).
138. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
139. See, e.g., Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
140. See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); Sonzinsky v. United States,
300 U.S. 506 (1937).
141. E.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
142. For conflicting appraisals of the historical material bearing upon the general
welfare clause, see Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress, 36 HA~v. L. REv. 548
(1923), and Tucker, The General Welfare, 8 VA. L. REv. 167 (1922). For a general
discussion of the general welfare clause see Nicholson. The Federal Spending Power, 9
TEmTLE L.Q. 3 (1934).
143. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Flint v. Stone Tracy
Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
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uated rates, then a taxpayer's showing that the operation of the rates is
no longer progressive makes out a case that the system is unconstitutional
because it no longer operates to provide for the general welfare.
As the quote from Knowlton which heads this article suggests, the
question now is: isn't it time that the judicial power "afford a remedy"
for extortionate, confiscatory taxation "by applying inherent and fun-
damental principles"? We think that it is. As was intimated in Brush-
aber, the Fifth Amendment applies where,
although there was a seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act
complained of was so arbitrary. . . that it was. . . a confiscation
of property. . . or. . . was so wanting in basis for classification
as to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably
lead to the same conclusion.144
The constitutional argument under Knowlton, Flint and Brushaber
then would challenge the present tax scheme's operation as irrational
on two grounds: it runs counter to Congress' stated progressive intent
(and so its continuance on the basis of that theory is internally incon-
sistent); and it is also irrational even absent any stated congressional
intent (on the ground that regressive taxation violates virtually all
modern economic and social theory).
There is another constitutional ground for challenging the tax sys-
tem, apart from the Fifth Amendment and the cited cases. If the gen-
eral welfare is the ground on which the taxing power is invoked, it is
also the standard against which the exercise of that power must be
tested. And although there are cases restricting the substantive mean-
ing of the "general welfare" language, it nonetheless has some mean-
ing; that meaning is measured by something akin to the minimum ra-
tionality standard of the Fifth Amendment. Thus if the scheme in
operation functions to the demonstrable detriment of the general wel-
fare, it violates the very constitutional provision in which it is anchored.
Equality and Fairness: The True Tests for the
Constitutionality of Tax Laws.
As was suggested at the outset, the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment has equal protection overtones as it is applied to federal
laws. 45 The development of the "new equal protection" doctrine, 46
144. 240 U.S. at 24-25.
145. If a narrow reading of due process were adopted and the tax system subjected
to only a minimal test, with the Court willing to imagine legislative ends, there is little
question that it would be upheld. But that standard is not appropriate where more than
economic regulation is in question-and the pervasive and systematic penalizing of
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when combined with cases like Loving v. Virginia 4 7 and Truax v.
Raich,148 suggests that notions of equality are constitutionally important
in the tax area. Just as unequal treatment in racial matters is offensive,
so too is inequality in taxation "at war with our basic concepts of a
democratic society .... -149 For "lines drawn on the basis of wealth
or property [which is the kind of discriminatory linedrawing which re-
sults from the current tax structure], like those of race . . . are tra-
ditionally disfavored."' 5
The real purpose of a taxpayer's suit challenging the constitu-
tionality of inequitable and therefore discriminatory tax laws would be
the enactment by Congress of tax laws geared to restore the democratic
ideal of progressivity.' 51 The Court's role here can be analogized to
the "affirmative action" cases in which the Court has ordered that cor-
rective measures be taken to right previous wrongs.' 52  We are not
suggesting that some new discrimination be perpetrated in order to
make up for past wrongs. That would be counterproductive. We are
suggesting that statutory tax revision is needed, and that if Congress
will not revise on its own initiative, then a suit in which the Court finds
lower-income taxpayers to the benefit of the rich, it is submitted, goes well beyond mere
economic regulation.
146. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword, 86 HAxv. L REv. 1
(1972). Cases frequently cited as illustrative of the "new equal protection!' doctrine in
operation include: San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); and Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Develop-
ment of the "new equal protection" idea is particularly appropriate when one recalls that
the federal Constitution's Bill of Rights was drawn from provisions in state constitutions,
particularly that of Virginia. Article 4 of Virginia's Declaration of Rights, adopted June
12, 1776, read: "that no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emolu-
ments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services . "
R. RumD, THm BrTH OF THE BIL op RIGHTs, 1776-91, 231 (1955).
147. 388 U.S. 1 (1967), where the Court stated that our institutions are based upon
a doctrine of equality.
148. 239 U.S. 33 (1915), suggesting that the right to work and the right to eco-
nomic security are the very essence of personal freedom and opportunity.
149. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
150. Harper v. Virginia State ,Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). See also
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), suggesting that welfare cannot constitution-
ally be apportioned on the basis of past tax contributions.
151. This can be achieved by a number of methods. See notes 101-23 supra and
text accompanying.
152. See note 5 supra. We recognize the improbability (and impropriety) of a
court's ordering Congress to revise the taxation system in any particular way. But a
judicial declaration that the existing system is unconstitutional in operation is at least
imaginable, and could force reform of the type we are advocating.
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the existing scheme to be constitutionally wrong and orders that some
affirmative action be taken is one way to provide impetus toward
achieving the overall goal. Congressional action is the goal because,
as suggested by Rodriguez,'0 8 in cases where there has been a legis-
lative attempt at equality the Court will defer to the legislature's de-
terminations unless those determinations are manifestly unreasonable.
The Court of course recognizes the right of the poor not to be dis-
criminated against (in education, or in taxation), and the same prin-
ciples-fairness, equality, the essential need of all citizens for some
minimum of economic well-being-under which the existing structure
would be condemned would lead the Court to sustain the enactments
once legislation to redress its inequities is passed." 4
Thus a concept of equality and a democratic economic principle
arise out of several constitutional provisions and their interpretation
Oust as does the right of privacy, for instance). This concept is not
a "levelling" doctrine, and it is not penal, but instead is informed by
the precept that those who benefit the most from the economic system,
and who have as a consequence the greatest ability to pay, should be
made to do so in pursuit of the "general welfare."
We do not ask the courts to rewrite the Constitution. Instead,
what we propose is a reaffirmation of principles long recognized by
our courts, and an application of those principles to the federal taxation
system. Just as Plessy v. Ferguson,1 rs with its rule of "separate but
equal," was finally re-examined in Brown v. Board of Education,05 be-
cause the expected fairness and equality was not achieved, so too
should Knowlton v. Moore and the charade of "progressive" tax rates
be re-examined when, as now, the tax system fails to produce the tax
equity which was the goal of the early decisions.
When loopholes and special tax privileges so dominate the tax sys-
tem as to make a mockery of the principle of progressive or democratic
taxation, then the whole structure of the tax law must be changed to
153. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
154. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), where the Court upheld fed-
eral voting rights legislation. The law looked to exemptions to the English literacy re-
quirements proposed by the state of New York, in effect, to determine that the New
York law was unfairly discriminatory. The conclusion was upheld by the Court. The
point relevant here has two elements: (1) the tax laws likewise contain many exemp-
tions from taxation which result in unfairness, and (2) new laws which eliminate dis-
criminatory barriers or privileges will be sustained by the courts because they are in har-
mony with our most basic egalitarian constitutional ideals.
155. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
156. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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bring it into harmony with the constitutional democratic ideal which we
have worked so hard to achieve in other areas.
To summarize in a single sentence: the potential viability of a
taxpayer's suit challenging the uniformity, fairness and constitutionality
of the current tax structure is but another strong reason for tax reform
now. And if none of this works? Legislators ought not to forget that
our forefathers dumped tea into Boston Harbor as a tax protest.

